Loss Leader

My colleague Joel Harrison is good at encapsulating learnings from his experience. In 2006, while I was visiting him at his startup company, Abrevity, he said, “You can’t justify a new product based on a cost analysis of the first-generation product. You have to have a vision.”

Joel and I had experienced the frustration of trying to create new products at a company that was in a high-volume, low-margin business — hard disk drives. On the one hand, Joel had prototyped a product that could have been the first available Ethernet-interfaced free-standing disk storage unit. I had been involved with defining a disk drive that stores and plays back video streams without a computer attached. While our company had funded the early prototyping of these products, it did not make the investment needed to launch them as consumer or end-user products.

Joel’s explanation, as I understand it, is that the company did an analysis of the cost of the first products in each case and concluded that the product cost too much to be priced reasonably in the marketplace. Now here’s where “vision” comes in. When you’re introducing a radical new product, you have to price it not based on the initial product’s cost, but based on a combination of the needs of the market and the expected cost curve as volume increases.

Companies selling services, such as cell phone service, do this all the time. To make the service workable, they have to invest a large amount of capital in infrastructure, such as cell phone towers, switching equipment, and so on. But pricing of the phone service must chosen both to make it attractive to the consumer and, when the number of subscribers reaches a reasonable target, to make a reasonable return on the investment.

The same thing is true with new products. The barrier to radical innovation and new product introduction in companies that have been operating in a low-margin high-volume environment for years is primarily a failure of imagination. They need the vision to see that (a) there is a market to be created or captured, (b) the product they have conceived is viable, and (c) initial pricing will lead to losses during the early stages of market development. Venture capital is based on selecting and funding this sort of innovation. But old companies have trouble thinking outside the low-margin, pay-for-itself-or-die product box.

That’s what Joel was telling me. If we could have planned the new businesses beyond the first product, and had got a commitment to fund the initial losses, we could have made history in disk drive marketing.

Shifting the focus to longer term

Startup organizations are typically unsustainable and barely stable, because:

1. The pressures to develop and market a first product require taking some expedient shortcuts, such as hiring the most capable, but not necessarily the most team-oriented individuals; placing all priority on getting a workable product out the door, rather than building the product for maintainability and growth; putting in the most features rather than the best-tested features.

2. The top management habitually focuses on the race between funds running out and product delivery, rather than on internal communications, employee satisfaction (except with the potential value of their options), and leadership style. The command-and-control management style is workable for the first few years, but typically fails to inspire the organization to build itself into a self-renewing structure.

3. Having a focus on delivering a product using already-developed technology, the company does not need to invest in longer-term development of underlying technologies, or in the people who will bring in a steady stream of new technology.

The short-term focus of a startup must change soon after the deliver of the first few products. Companies that fail to incorporate longer-term thinking around their third year find themselves living from crisis to crisis. This makes the company unattractive to good managers and good technologists who don’t necessarily get their jolllies from living in a startup environment, where “startup” means short-term thinking.

What sort of changes does your organization need, now that the product has been delivered? A new CEO who actually allows the organization to function as if there were competence at all levels? A seasoned technology executive who knows what to do to make the organization attractive to innovative people? A shift in emphasis to listening to customer feedback and involving existing customers in product decisions? Addition of a Quality department that actually has the teeth to delay a product introduction?

Whatever the changes needed, don’t be surprised by the shift. Two reactions to the shift are typical:
(1) “What happened to my adrenaline rush?” — the people who need crises to keep up their energy should pursue another startup.
(2) “I didn’t know that a company could actually plan and execute with the future (beyond 1 month) in mind!” — the people who are stressed by the company’s failure to plan and execute for the long term grow into steady, reliable contributors.

A + B + C ≠ D (The game changes at the fourth round of financing)

When a startup company reaches a certain size, a number of changes have to occur to allow it to survive. Here are some of them:

1. The founders have to choose new roles for themselves. Having been key idea-people or leaders of a particular part of the business process, they may have trouble envisioning themselves in a role that meshes with a larger company. This is OK — particularly if they are willing to go off and found another company. Where it’s not OK is in a company that desperately needs to establish processes that work for the long term, and a founder is standing in the way of moving in that direction. The impetus to change things may come from the venture investors, from other key executives in the company, or — rarely — from a founder him- or herself. ‘Tis a wise founder who knows his/her own limitations.

2. Product development has to become more predictable. While at this stage of growth a company often is launching multiple development projects at the same time, the need to know when the process will complete becomes more important as the customer base grows and Marketing starts implementing more sophisticated product introductions. In addition, the engineers who have survived the startup environment are often close to burnout, accustomed to an unstructured work environment, and unwilling to consider that in a larger company, risk has to be reduced. What kind of risk? Things like making sure that software backups are made, versions of code are archived, drawings are in fire-safe locations, and that the website is not offering free access to proprietary design information.

3. Knowing how long it will take to implement certain features, whether software or hardware implemented, is key to becoming predictable. Predictablity can be helped by agile development methods, which emphasize frequent demonstrations of working models, making regular estimates of output over the next few weeks and refining one’s ability to predict that output. This gives the developers a lot of say in the process, while also getting realistic “customer” feedback on features and functions on a regular basis.

4. The company management may have to pay attention to issues that aren’t so prominent during the early startup phase, such as infrastructure (development tools, website and equipment maintenance), retention & professional development, trade associations & standards, and intellectual property protection.

5. Scaling up the company is not just a matter of cloning the existing projects and production lines. As a new layer of management is brought in to allow expansion of the operating departments, the top management must examine its way of working, including values, culture, communications, and transparency. Plotting strategy without considering these factors can leave them wondering why the workforce isn’t following management’s lead.

Marketing takes over Engineering

What happens when Marketing takes over the Engineering function?

One of my current clients has a very strong VP/founder who knows a lot about engineering things.

As a startup, the company successfully introduced novel products because everyone worked on everything — the usual startup mode for a technology company. As products are turned (they are on their 8th product now), Engineering needs to get some predictability to its schedules and commitments. But Marketing continues to drive a lot of the Engineering operation simply by paying more attention to the detail than the Engineering VP does.

The situation doesn’t look bad from a technology point of view — there are good decisions made, even if they continue to be made (product features added) throughout the development cycle. But the recently hired senior managers in Engineering are going crazy, because they have two masters — the Engineering VP and the Marketing VP. Which one should they listen to?

My advice to them for now is to get their operations in order — write functional specs (or at least a prioritized list of features), meet schedules by biting off incremental pieces of the implementation at a time, report on exactly when changes were made to the requirements and how long it took to accomodate the change. Then press the two VPs to settle the issue of how Engineering is to be managed. It can’t be settled by the next level of management, so long as it is unsettled at the top.